ABSTRACT In Bitcoin financial system, a user's privacy is supposed to be protected by means of anonymity. However, the anonymity makes illegal trades possible because nobody is able to reveal the real identities of the illegal users. In this paper, we propose a regulation scheme based on the ciphertext-policy hierarchical attribute-based encryption (CP-HABE). In the scheme, users' identities are encrypted by using access policy and are contained in their transaction. A type of user is defined as the dependable regulation node, which is responsible for the regulation of transactions and encrypted identities. A new signature algorithm instead of the elliptic curve signature is adopted to generate wallet key pairs, this establishes a connection between wallet addresses and encrypted identities. When a transaction is doubted to involve illegal activities, the authorized regulation nodes are capable of revealing the users' real identities and add the illegal identities to a public blacklist. Our system is based on a new CP-HABE scheme which is proved to be secure against chosen-plaintext attack in the standard model under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption. Finally, we give a performance analysis of our system. The proposed regulation system can reveal criminals' identities undertaking illegal activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is a decentralized, anonymous virtual currency [1] . Unlike other currencies, it is not controlled by central authorities but relies on cryptography and peer-to-peer networks [2] . The online transactions are directly made between consumers and merchants without a trusted third party such as a bank, and all transactions are recorded in Blockchain [3] , a distributed database. This provides users with lower transaction costs [4] . Furthermore, all users are allowed to utilize different pseudonyms in different transactions [5] , [6] , which makes it difficult for anyone to track users' real identities.
Bitcoin has gained great popularity among public and has experienced a rapid growth in both value and market volume since 2012. However, the anonymity and the lack of central authorities has made it attractive to users to engage in criminal activities [7] . An evidence is that Bitcoin is increasingly becoming a tool for money laundering [8] , tax evasion [9] , and illicit products selling [10] . Users can buy drugs, weapons, or other almost any illegal things they want in darknet market websites [11] - [13] such as the Silk Road, the Armory and the General Store, without having to worry about their identities being tracked.
The misuse of Bitcoin for criminal activities has caused the attention of governments and financial regulators, whereas the attitudes towards the regulation of Bitcoin are diverse [14] . Some people insist that users have the right to protect their privacy and freely trade with Bitcoin. Therefore they think Bitcoin should remain unregulated and anonymous. Others think that Bitcoin should be regulated to control users' behaviors and reduce illegal activities. In our view, the protection of users' privacy is important, while a regulated system is more significant and necessary for online Bitcoin transactions. When Bitcoins are lost or stolen, regulators can help users find their Bitcoins back. More importantly, when a transaction is doubted to involve illegal activities, regulators can verify the identities of criminals. As can be seen from the above, a well-regulated Bitcoin system facilitates social stability and economic development.
In response to the illegal use of Bitcoin, some measures have been implemented, such as prohibiting the use of Bitcoin, or using real identities to register to Bitcoin exchanges. As Bitcoin is decentralized, it is impossible to completely ban all the use of Bitcoin. And the realname authentication may leak users' privacy when Bitcoin exchanges are attacked. In this paper, taking into account both the privacy protection and the regulation, a new regulation scheme is proposed. In the scheme, we add users' encrypted real identities into a transaction, and enforce access control policy for these identities. The access control policy makes sure that an identity is invisible to ordinary users but is accessible to authorized regulation nodes when needed. Regulation nodes are a type of users who have the priority to reveal the real identities of users, such as the governments. To ensure the authenticity of identities, we establish an internal connection between a user's identity and wallet address by using a modified signature (MS) algorithm based on the identity-based signature (IBS) proposed by Chen et al. [15] . In the MS scheme, a user's public key is not the real identity but the hash of the user's identity and a random value. The user's secret key consists of two parts, one is from the private key generator and another from the user. Different random values can be chosen to generate different signature key pairs. If one's identity is confidential, we cannot find the connection between a wallet public key and the identity. Only when an identity is revealed, can we verify whether a public key is related to the identity or not.
To achieve flexible access control of users' real identities, we adopt the attribute-based encryption (ABE) [16] . There are two kinds of ABE, key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [17] and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [18] . In a CP-ABE scheme, a ciphertext is encrypted with an access policy and a user's private key is related to a set of attributes. Only if a user's attribute set meets the access policy of a ciphertext can the user decrypt the ciphertext. CP-ABE is more suitable for data access control than KP-ABE as its access policy is determined by data owner. However, general CP-ABE schemes do not take into account the hierarchical relationship among attributes, which are not suitable for hierarchical regulation nodes. Therefore we use hierarchical ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-HABE) scheme to encrypt users' real identities, which can achieve both fine-grained access control and hierarchical attributes. Thus a regulation node of high level can decrypt identities that can also be decrypted by its child regulation nodes.
The first hierarchical ABE (HABE) was proposed by Li et al. [19] , which cannot provide fine-grained access control as it uses threshold access policy. Schemes in [20] - [22] only support disjunctive normal form (DNF) and conjunctive normal form (CNF) access control policy, which also limit the expression of access policy. The scheme in [23] is based on Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS), but it requires three pairing operations for each attribute, and the relationship between different levels is not described clearly. In our system, regulation nodes between different levels may have an inheritance relationship. In this paper, we combine HABE in [19] and CP-ABE in [24] , and propose a new CP-HABE scheme based on LSSS, where the attributes of different levels in the same tree may have an inheritance relationship.
In our scheme, the regulation of Bitcoin transactions is classified into three stages. In the first stage, users generate transactions and send them into blockchain. A transaction must include all the users' encrypted identities and their signatures. Here the CP-HABE is adopted to encrypt identities, and MS is applied to sign transactions. In the second stage, miners verify the validity of transactions, including verifying the signatures of users, the trace of Bitcoin source and so on. In the last stage, if a transaction is doubted to involve illegal activities, regulation nodes can decrypt ciphertexts and reveal criminals' identities. The reality of revealed identities can be verified by the relationship between wallet addresses and the identities.
The major contributions could be summarized as follows:
• A regulation scheme with access control of identities is proposed to regulate Bitcoin transactions and to prevent criminals from illegal acts. We add users' encrypted real identities into a transaction and enforce access control policy for these identities. Regulation nodes are defined to reveal the users' real identities by decrypting the identity ciphertexts. Once a regulation node decrypts a fake identity, it submits a request to the key server to get the real identity and add the corresponding real identity to the public blacklist. Thus all wallet addresses of this user cannot be used anymore.
• A new CP-HABE scheme is proposed to encrypt users' identities. Attributes of high level are assigned to regulation nodes and attributes of low level are assigned to ordinary users. Therefore the regulation nodes have more priorities than ordinary users. We divide all regulation nodes into different levels in a tree with different priorities. A regulation node of higher level has more priorities than that of lower level, meaning that it can manage and regulate more identities. The new CP-HABE scheme is analyzed from both security and efficiency aspects. It is proved to be secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) in the standard model. The simulation of CP-HABE is also given.
• A modified signature based on IBS without disclosing identities is used to generate wallet key pairs. This establishes a connection between a user's identity and the user's wallet addresses. But only authorized regulation nodes whose attribute sets satisfy the access structure can get a user's real identity and reveal the relationship between the identity and its corresponding wallet addresses.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR MAPS
Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of order p, where p is a large prime number. A map e : G × G → G T is called a bilinear map if it has the following properties:
For all a, b ∈ Z p and u, v ∈ G, the equation e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab holds.
2) NON-DEGENERACY
There exists an element g ∈ G where e(g, g) = 1.
3) COMPUTABILITY
For any u, v ∈ G, the value e(u, v) can be calculated in a polynomial time.
B. ATTRIBUTES HIERARCHY TREE
The same as the scheme in [19] , the universal attributes are classified into n trees according to their logical relationship. Each node is associated with an attribute, and an attribute only belongs to one tree. An ancestral node can derive its descendant's key, but the reverse is not allowed. For each attribute ω, assume that it is located in the i th tree with the depth of k, and its path is defined as a vector R ω = (ω i0 , ω i1 , . . . , ω ik ), where k < h and ω ik = ω. We say that ω covers ω with the path R ω = (ω j0 , ω j1 , . . . , ω jk ) if ω iδ = ω jδ for 0 ≤ δ ≤ k. It means that ω has a priority of higher level than ω in the access control system if ω covers ω . In fact, each attribute in the path R ω can cover the attribute ω.
For an attribute set S = {ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω n }, the path R(S) is defined as R(S) = {R ω 1 , R ω 2 , . . . , R ω n }. If a set S of attributes satisfies an access policy AP, we say that the path R(S) also satisfies the access policy AP.
C. LINEAR SECRET-SHARING SCHEMES
A secret-sharing scheme over a set of parties P is linear if it satisfies the following two properties:
1) The shares of each party form a vector over Z p .
2) There is a share-generating matrix M of d rows and e columns for . Let ρ be a function from {1, . . . , d} to P which maps the i th row M i of matrix M to some party ρ(i) in P. Given a random vector v = (s, v 2 , . . . , v d ), where s is the secret to be shared, and v 2 , . . . , v d are randomly chosen from Z p . We compute M · v as the shares of the secret value s, and M i v belongs to party ρ(i).
Linear Reconstruction: Let be an LSSS for the access policy, and S be an authorized set. Define a set of subscripts I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , d} as I = {σ : ρ(σ ) ∈ R(S)}. There exist constants {λ σ ∈ Z p } σ ∈I such that for any set of valid shares {s σ } of a secret s according to , σ ∈I s σ λ σ = s. These constants {λ σ } can be found in polynomial time in the size of the share-generating matrix M . For the security property of LSSS, no such constants {λ σ } exist for unauthorized sets.
D. CP-HABE SCHEME
The proposed CP-HABE scheme consists of five algorithms: ABE-Setup, ABE-KeyGen, ABE-Delegate, ABE-Encrypt and ABE-Decrypt.
1) ABE-SETUP
The algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ . It outputs the public parameters PK and the master key MK .
2) ABE-KEYGEN
The algorithm takes as input the master key MK and a set S u of attributes. It outputs the user's private key sk u .
3) ABE-DELEGATE
The algorithm takes as input a secret key sk u for some set of attributes S u and a setS u ⊆ S u . It outputs a secret key sk u for the setS u . A user can decrypt a ciphertext only when the user's set of attributes satisfies the access structure in the ciphertext. Users who can decrypt the ciphertext are called authorized users.
4) ABE-ENCRYPT
The algorithm picks a message m to be encrypted and an access structure (M , ρ) related to the policy AP as inputs. It outputs a ciphertext CT of the message m. Only users who have a set of attributes that satisfies the access structure can decrypt the message.
5) ABE-DECRYPT
The algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK , a ciphertext CT which contains an access structure (M , ρ), and a private key sk u which is a private key for the set S u of attributes. If the set S u satisfies the access structure, it will return message m. A user can decrypt a ciphertext only when the user's set of attributes satisfies the access structure in the ciphertext.
E. CP-HABE SECURITY MODEL
We give our CP-HABE security model as follows:
Initialization: The adversary gives the challenge access structure (M * , ρ * ).
Setup: The challenger runs the ABE-Setup algorithm to generate the master secret key MK and the public parameter PK . The public parameter PK is given to the adversary A.
Phase 1: Private key queries for the attribute sets are made by the adversary A. The challenger sends private key to A if the attribute set does not satisfy the challenge access structure.
Challenge: The adversary A sends two messages m 0 and m 1 with an equal length. The challenger flips a random coin b, and encrypts m b under (M * , ρ * ). The ciphertext CT * is given to the adversary.
Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess:
The adversary outputs a guess b of b.
The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as
The CP-HABE scheme is secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.
The decisional q-parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) problem is defined as follows.
Choose a group G of order p according to the security parameter. Let a, s be chosen at random from Z p . In addition, randomly choose g as a generator of the group G. Given y a,s,q = (g, g s , y 1 , y 2 . . . , y q , y q+2 , . . . , y 2q ), where y i = g a i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2l, it's hard to distinguish e(g, g) a q+1 s ∈ G T from a random element in G T . The adversary A has an advantage in solving the decisional q-parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent problem if
F. THE MODIFIED SIGNATURE
In order to establish a connection between a user's identity and the user's wallet addresses, we use the MS scheme based on the IBS scheme in [15] instead of the elliptic curve signature to generate keys for transaction. The MS scheme is the same as the IBS scheme except that the users' identities are kept secret, and the new signature algorithm consists of four algorithms: MS-Setup, MS-KeyGen, MS-Signing and MS-Verifying. Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group of prime order q, and G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q.P is the generator of group G 1 . The bilinear pairings is a map e 1 :
1) MS-SETUP
The key server chooses a random value s * ∈ Z * q , and sets the master key as MK ibs = s * . The system public key is P pub = s * P. The public parameter PK ibs is defined as PK ibs = {P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 }.
2) MS-KEYGEN
A user chooses a random value r * ∈ Z * q and computes r * P. Then the user submits {ID, r * P} to the key server, where ID denotes the identity of the user. The key server verifies the validity of the identity ID. If it is available, the key server computes Q ID = H 2 (ID, r * P), S ID = s * Q ID = s * H 2 (ID, r * P), and sends S ID to the user via a secure channel.
The signature public key pk sig and private key sk sig of the user with identity ID are:
3) MS-SIGNING
The signer's identity is denoted by ID. To sign a message m, the signer randomly chooses t * ∈ Z * q , and computes
4) MS-VERIFYING
When receiving a signature (V 1 , V 2 , V 3 , r * P), the verifier computes V = H 1 (m, V 1 + V 2 ). The signature will be accepted if the following equations hold:
In the MS scheme, a user's public key is not the real identity but the hash of the identity randomized by a random value. Through the MS-KeyGen algorithm, users can generate different key pairs by choosing different random values {r * i }.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The purpose of our scheme is to make it possible to regulate illegal transactions in Bitcoin system. The main idea is to encrypt the users' identities using CP-HABE. Only the authorized regulation nodes have the correct key to the decrypted identities. To ensure the reality of encrypted identities, MS scheme is adopted rather than the elliptic curve signature scheme.
As shown in Fig.1 , the system model consists of 4 entities: key server, users, regulation nodes, and miners.
A. KEY SERVER
The key server, also the certificate authority, is responsible for the verification of identities and distribution of key pairs. Beyond that, it sends user ID to regulation nodes when they make reasonable inquiries.
B. USER
Users make transactions in Bitcoin or verify transactions to earn Bitcoin as a reward. A user can be a buyer, a seller or a miner.
C. REGULATION NODE
Regulation nodes are responsible for the regulation of transactions, but they are not involved in the transaction process, which is essentially different from the centralized parties such as banks. We can assign many nodes as the regulation nodes, obviously, it does not violate the decentralization of Bitcoin system. When a transaction is doubted to be illegal, authorized regulation nodes are able to reveal the identities of the criminals. Regulation nodes and users are divided into different levels in a tree according to their regulation level, as is shown in Fig.2 . Each node in the tree denotes a regulation node. Regulation nodes of a higher level have more privilege to decrypt ciphertexts. For example, regulation node R1 can decrypt the ciphertexts of user set US1. Regulation node R5 has access to user sets US1 and US2. Similarly, R7 has access to user sets US1, US2, US3, and US4. 
D. MINER
A miner is a user who collects and verifies transactions. All users can work as miners in the system.
Suppose that most of users in Bitcoin system are honest, and regulation nodes are all dependable. According to Fig.1 , the working process of our system consists of three parts.
1) KEY GENERATION
The key server initializes system and generates ABE parameters as well as MS parameters. When users or regulation nodes send requests for registration, the key server verifies the identities of them and assigns attribute keys for them. Wallet key pairs are also required if users want to make transactions. In our system, the wallet public keys are related to users' identities. And the relationship between a wallet public key and a user's identity is only known by the user and the key server. As shown in Fig.3 , a user submits his or her own identity and a random number. If the identity is valid, the key server assigns to the user a wallet public key and an incomplete wallet secret key. The user has the other part of the wallet secret key. A user who submits a fake identity cannot get the wallet key pairs. Fig.4 shows the process of making a transaction. Suppose that user A is a buyer and user B is a seller. User A generates a transaction and runs the ABE-Encrypt algorithm to encrypt the identity of A with an access control policy. Next, user A runs the MS-Signing algorithm and signs the transaction using the wallet secret key corresponding to the VOLUME 6, 2018 wallet address. Then the transaction as well as the encrypted identity of A is sent to the seller B via the peer-to-peer network.
2) TRANSACTION GENERATION
When seller B receives the transaction, he (or she) encrypts his (or her) identity with another access control policy by running the ABE-Encrypt algorithm. Then the transaction which contains encrypted identities of A and B is sent to the blockchain.
Here we suppose that the access control policy of A enables no user but himself (or herself) to decrypt the identity. The assumption is also applied to B. Thus A and B cannot get each other's identity. But due to the hierarchical property of CP-HABE, a regulation node whose attributes cover that of user A can also decrypt user A's identity in a transaction.
3) TRANSACTION VERIFICATION AND REGULATION
Miners check the validity of transactions in the blockchain. Regulation nodes reveal the real identities of illegal users and add illegal identities into a public blacklist.
In the verification stage, miners check whether the wallet addresses are linked to identities in the blacklist. Next, they verify the signatures and the validation of the transaction. Then the valid transactions are put into a block. The first miner to finish a proof of work in a period broadcasts his (or her) block into blockchain. Other miners verify all the transactions in this block. If all transactions pass the validation, the blockchain will be updated.
If an authorized regulation node wants to reveal a user's identity in a suspicious transaction, it uses the authorized attribute keys to decrypt the ciphertext and get user's identity. The regulation node verifies the identity by computing a hash value and compares it with the transaction wallet address. If they are equal, the resulted identity is a correct identity. If not, the regulation node sends request to the key server for getting the real identity of the user, and then add the user's identity into the blacklist. So that all the wallet addresses of this user cannot be used in the system.
IV. BITCOIN REGULATION SYSTEM
A. THE PROPOSED CP-HABE SCHEME Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p and e 2 : G × G → G T be a bilinear map. Besides, g is defined as a generator of group G.
1) ABE-SETUP
The key sever first initializes the universal attributes set S = {ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω N }, where ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω N ∈ Z p , the subscript N denotes the number of attributes in S. These attributes are divided into n trees according to their relationship. Assume that the depth of i th tree is l i , and l = max{l i } i∈ [1,n] . For i = 1, . . . , n, choose a random element u i ∈ G and a random vector
It also chooses two random values α, a ∈ Z p . The public parameter PK abe and the master key MK abe are as follows:
2) ABE-KEYGEN
The algorithm takes as input user's set of attributes S u ⊆ S and the master key MK abe , output the user's secret key sk u . The key server picks up a random number r ∈ Z p , and computes D = g α+ar . Suppose that ω ⊆ S u is an attribute in the i th tree with depth k and path
where
3) ABE-DELEGATE
The algorithm takes as input a setS u ⊆ S u of attributes and a secret key sk u = (D, D , {D ω } ∀ω∈S u ) which is generated from the set S u . Randomr is chosen to create a new secret key sk u . The delegation key for setS u is:
4) ABE-ENCRYPT
The encryption algorithm is executed by the sender. It takes as input the public parameter PK abe , a message m to be encrypted, and an access structure (M , ρ), where M is a matrix of d rows and e columns, and ρ maps the σ th row M σ of matrix M to a certain attribute ρ(σ ).
First, choose a secret value s ∈ Z p , and some random elements v 2 , . . . , v e ∈ Z p , let v = (s, v 2 , . . . , v e ) T be a column vector.
where s σ is the σ th share of secret s. Suppose that ρ(σ ) = ω , where attribute ω is in the j th tree with depth of k and path of R(ω ) = (ω j0 , ω j1 , . . . , ω jk ), then s σ belongs to ω according to the map ρ. To encrypt message m, it chooses r σ ∈ Z p for all σ = 1, 2, . . . , d and computesC = mY s , C = g −s . The ciphertext CT is:
5) ABE-DECRYPT
A user whose attribute set satisfies the access policy AP of a ciphertext CT is called an authorized user for CT. If an authorized user with key sk u = (D, D , {D ω } ∀ω∈S u ) wants to decrypt the ciphertext CT = (C, C, {C σ 1 , C σ 2 } ∀σ ∈ [1,d] ), first the user should match attributes and find the minimum set S u that satisfies the access policy AP from S u . Define the subscript set I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , d} as I = {σ : ρ(σ ) ∈ S u . For each attribute ω ∈ S u with path {ω i0 , ω i1 , . . . , ω}, suppose that ρ(σ ) = ω with path (ω i0 , ω i1 , . . . , ω is covered by attribute ω, then we have ω iδ = ω iδ for 1 ≤ δ ≤ k. For all σ ∈ I , it computes d i as follow:
Suppose that the attribute set S u meets the access policy, then according to the reconstruction property of LSSS, there exists a set {λ σ ∈ Z p } σ ∈I of constants corresponding to the valid shares {s σ } σ ∈I , such that σ ∈I s σ λ σ = s.
Then message m can be recovered:
σ ∈I e 2 (g, g)
B. BITCOIN REGULATION SYSTEM 1) SYSTEM SETUP The key server runs ABE-Setup algorithm and MS-Setup algorithm to generate public parameter PK = PK ibs PK abe and the master key MK = MK ibs MK abe .
2) REGISTRATION When a user with identity ID sends a registration request, if the identity is available, the key server assigns the user to a set S u of attributes and runs the ABE-KeyGen algorithm. The key server chooses a random number r ∈ Z p and computes the user's secret key sk u according to the set of attributes. The registration of a miner or a regulation node is the same as the registration of an ordinary user.
3) WALLET KEY PAIRS GENERATION
If user A wants to generate a group of wallet key pairs, the user first chooses some random values r * a1 , r * a2 , ..., r * an * ∈ Z * q and submits r * a1 P, r * a2 P, ..., r * an * P as well as the identity ID A to the key server, the key server calls the MS-KeyGen algorithm, and works together with the user to generate a series of wallet key pairs for user A: 
4) TRANSACTION GENERATION
Suppose that A and B are making a transaction. There are six steps: a. User A generates the transaction information Trans which includes the transaction volume, the receiver's wallet address, and the source of Bitcoin to be paid and so on. b. A randomly chooses an element s 1 ∈ Z p and runs the ABE-Encrypt algorithm to encrypt ID A with access control policy P A . The ciphertext is:
c. A runs the MS-Signing algorithm and chooses a wallet address pk ai to sign the transaction using the corresponding wallet secret key sk ai . Then the resulted transaction Trans CT A ||σ A is sent to the seller B via the peer-to-peer network. The signature of the transaction signed by A is:
where V A1 = t * pk ai , V A2 = r * ai H 2 (Trans CT A , V 1 ), and V A3 = (t * + V )s * pk ai . d. B randomly chooses an element s 2 ∈ Z p and runs the ABE-Encrypt algorithm to encrypt ID B with access control policy P B . The ciphertext is:
e. B runs the MS-Signing algorithm and signs the transaction using the wallet secret key sk bj corresponding to the wallet address pk bj . The signature of the transaction signed by B is:
, and
is broadcast to the blockchain. Note that the public key to verify σ A is not the identity ID A of user A but the wallet address pk ai = H 2 (ID A , r * ai P), where r * ai is a random value. Therefore the signature σ A will cause no privacy leakage of identity ID A . Similarly, σ B will not reveal the identity of user B.
5) TRANSACTION VERIFICATION
When miners receive the transaction T AB , they first verify whether the wallet addresses are illegal or not. To verify the wallet address of A, for each identity ID * in the blacklist, miners compute H 2 (ID * , r * ai P) and compare it with the wallet address pk ai . If they are equal, then ID A = ID * , which reveals that buyer A is an illegal user in the blacklist, then the transaction will be refused; otherwise, miners continue to verify the wallet address of seller B in the same way.
If none of the identities in the blacklist is linked to pk ai or pk bj , miners run MS-Verifying algorithm to verify the signatures σ A and σ B by using the wallet addresses of A and B. For example, to verify σ A , miners compute V = H 1 (Trans CT A , V 1 + V 2 ) and check whether (22) and (23) hold:
If the two equations hold, σ A is a valid signature. The verification of σ B is the same.
If both σ A and σ B are correct, then miners verify the reality of Trans. The identities of users which are not in the blacklist cannot be revealed by miners in transaction verification stage, but they are likely to be revealed by regulation nodes in the transaction regulation stage (step (6)).
6) TRANSACTION REGULATION
Regulation nodes randomly choose transactions to verify the users' identities. For example, if an authorized regulation node wants to get the identity of A via the wallet address pk ai and the transaction information, it runs the ABE-Decrypt algorithm and inputs the authorized attribute keys as well as the ciphertext CT A . The algorithm will return an identity ID . Then the regulation node verifies the identity by computing a hash value pk = H 2 (ID , r * ai P) and comparing it with the wallet address pk ai . If they are equal, we get ID = ID A , and A is an honest user. If they are not equal, the regulation node sends request to the key server to get the real identity of A, and adds ID A into the public blacklist. This means that all the wallet addresses of user A are marked as illegal addresses.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM
In our Bitcoin regulation system, two cryptographic algorithms were applied, the signature algorithm and the CP-HABE algorithm. The signature scheme was already proved to be secure by Chen et al. [15] , here we will make an analysis mainly on the efficiency and security of CP-HABE scheme.
A. PERFORMANCE
In this section, we estimate the performance of CP-HABE from computation cost and storage cost. Table 1 gives the storage cost of our CP-HABE scheme and scheme [23] , where l T , l 1 , l 3 is the bit length of the elements of group G T , subgroup of order p 1 , subgroup of order p 3 in scheme [23] . Let l * 1 , l * 2 be the bit lengths of the elements of group G and G T , respectively. The number of trees and the maximum depth of trees are n, l, respectively. The rows and columns of M are d and e, respectively.
Suppose that all the trees have the same depth l, and a user's attribute level is k. From Table 1 , we find that our public parameter size is linear with (n + ln + 2), which is larger than the scheme in [23] . However, our scheme has a shorter size in both private key and ciphertext. User private key size is linear with the number of attributes but decreases with the attribute depth. When k = l, the size of private key is (|sk u | + 2) · l * 1 . It means a user with low level has a short private key size. The ciphertext size is linear with the row number of generating matrix M . Table 2 shows the computation cost of our scheme and the scheme in [23] . The computation cost of an exponent and a bilinear are denoted by τ e and τ p , respectively. And τ r is the time cost of choosing a random element, |I | is the number of attributes in the min authorized set. We suppose that the attribute depth in the access policy is k . From the Table 2 , we can see that the computation cost of ABE-KeyGen algorithm is linear with the attribute tree depth l and the attribute number |sk u |. The computation cost of ABE-Encrypt is related to the depth of attributes k in the policy and the row number d of generating matrix M . In the ABE-Decrypt algorithm, the computation cost of pairing operation is (|I | + 2)τ p , which nearly decreases two times compared with scheme [23] .
We implement our CP-HABE based on the libfenc2.0 (https://code.google.com/archive/p/libfenc/), which is a library developed for CP-ABE. It also uses the pairing-based library ( http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/). The simulation is performed on the centos 6.0 with core i3 2.1GHz CPU and 4GB RAM. The results are shown in Fig.5 . Fig.5 (a) shows the time cost of ABE-Setup algorithm for different max tree depth l of the attribute trees. In this figure, the number of attribute trees n is set to 5. We can see that the time cost increases linearly with the increase of the max tree depth l. If l is given, the ABE-Setup will be completed in a constant time. Fig.5 (b) shows that the time cost of ABE-Setup with the number of trees n, where l = 3. It is obvious that the time cost is linear with n.
The time cost of ABE-KeyGen as the function of the number of attributes in user private key is shown in Fig.5(c) , where l is set to 3. From Table 2 , we can find that if l is a constant value, the computation cost of to generate private key for a user is only determined by the number of attributes in the user's attribute list, which can also be observed intuitively in Fig.5(c) . Fig.5 (d) shows the time cost to generate private keys for 100 users in the highest level, where the max tree depth l = 3.
The time for the encrypt operation is depended on the number of rows in the matrix related to access policy. As the max tree depth is 3, the depth of attributes in the ciphertext access policy k may be 0, 1, or 2. As shown in Fig.5 (e) , the time cost of ABE-Encrypt increases with the depth of k . And when k remains unchanged, the encrypt time cost is linear with the number of rows in the matrix related to access policy.
The time for decrypt operation is related to not only the min number of attributes that satisfy the access policy but also related to the difference between the depth of attribute in the private key and the depth of attribute in the ciphertext policy. Suppose that the attribute in user private key is 0 (the highest level). Fig.5 (f) shows that the time cost of ABE-Decrypt is linear with the number of attributes needed to decrypt a ciphertext. In addition, it is obvious that the bigger the difference between k and k, the longer time will cost to decrypt a ciphertext.
The HABE scheme in [19] is based on threshold access policy, and schemes in [20] - [22] only support disjunctive normal form (DNF) and conjunctive normal form (CNF) access control policy. These schemes cannot provide flexible access control. The scheme in [23] is based on LSSS which enriched the expression of access control policy, but it has low efficiency in decryption phase. Our scheme can achieve both flexible access control and higher decryption efficiency.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) COLLUSION RESISTANCE
One of the main challenges in attribute-based encryption is how to protect against different users from combining their private keys to get an authorized key. Like other attributebased encryption schemes, random numbers are inserted into every user's private key so that it can prevent against attacks from colluding users.
Theorem 1: The construction of the CP-HABE is collusion resistant.
Proof: In order to get the message m, an attacker must know e 2 (g, g) αs , clearly it is impossible to get e 2 (g, g) αs from the public parameters PK . So the attacker must compute the bilinear pairing e 2 (C, D). This may result in the value e 2 (g, g) −s(α+ar) , but the attacker can't get the desired value e 2 (g, g) αs as it is blinded by e 2 (g, g) αrs . Only if the attacker has an authorized key components can he recover the value e 2 (g, g) αrs . And the combination of different users' key will not work because there are random numbers embedded in different users' private keys, which makes the collusion attacks meaningless.
2) CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT ATTACK (CPA)
Theorem 2: Assume that the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds. Then no polynomial time adversary can selectively break our system with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A with non-negligible advantage = Adv A in the selective security game against our construction. Moreover, suppose the adversary chooses a challenge matrix M * with both dimensions at most q. Then we can build a simulator B to play the decisional q-parallel BDHE problem.
Initialization: The simulator takes in a q-parallel BDHE challenge y a,s,q , T . The adversary declares the challenge access structure (M * , ρ * ), where M * is a challenge matrix of size d * × e * , and d * , e * ≤ q. Setup: Initialize the set of universal attributes as S * = (ω * 1 , ω * 2 , . . . , ω * N ), where N = |S * | is the number of attributes in S * . Suppose that the N attributes in S * are divided into n trees, the depth of the i th tree is l i , and l = max{l i } i∈ [1,n] < q. For every attribute ω * in the i th tree with depth k, define its path as (ω * i0 , ω * i1 , . . . , ω * ). In addition, we also denote the tree where ω in by a function Tree(ω). Attribute trees that appear in the access structure (M * , ρ * ) can be described as
When receiving the challenge access structure (M * , ρ * ) from the adversary A, the simulator B chooses two random values α , β ∈ Z p and sets α = α + α q+1 . Then we get e 2 (g, g) α = e 2 (g a , g a q ) · e 2 (g, g) α . It also randomly chooses t i1 , t i2 , . . . , t il i ∈ G for i = 1 to n, and sets U i as follows: The public key PK = (g, g β , e 2 (g, g) α , {u i , U i } i∈ [1,n] ) is sent to the adversary A. Phase 1. The adversary A makes private key queries for every set S * u of attributes that doesn't meet the access structure (M * , ρ * ). By the property of linear reconstruction of LSSS, the simulator can find a vector λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ e * ) ∈ Z e * p such that λ 1 = −1 and for any σ that ρ * (σ ) ∈ S * u , and the equation M * σ · λ = 0 holds.
The simulator chooses a random value r from Z p , and defines r as:
Then it computes D and D as:
, the simulator computes:
For attribute ω * ∈ S * u such that Tree (ω * ) / ∈ T * , we have u i = g t i , then d i and D ω * are:
where 
Assume that the attribute ω * * = ρ * (σ ) is in the j th tree with depth k . Then the rest of the ciphertext components are computed as follows: 
The simulator B sends CT = ( C,C, {C σ 1 , C σ 2 } ∀σ ∈[1,d * ] ) to the adversary A.
Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated and none of sets of attributes satisfies the access structure.
Guess: The adversary A outputs a guess b of b. If b , it outputs 0 to guess that T = e 2 (g, g) a q+1 s . Otherwise, it outputs 1 to guess that T is a random element in G T .
When T = e 2 (g, g) a q+1 s , we can get (33). And when T is a random element in G T , we have (34). Therefore, B can play the q-parallel BDHE game with non-negligible advantage.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The decentralization property gives users the freedom to make transactions directly with each other. There are no governments, companies, or banks in charge of Bitcoin. From this perspective, users can manage their own assets with a large degree of freedom and reduce the communication cost with the trusted center. On the other hand, the lack of the regulation in Bitcoin may lead to some bad events. Malicious users may use Bitcoin to make illegal transactions such as drug trade, human trafficking, money laundering and fraud. If there is no an effective scheme to regulate and punish these criminals, users' benefits cannot be guaranteed and our society will be out of order.
In order to strengthen the regulation of Bitcoin transactions, some measures have been implemented, such as prohibiting the use of Bitcoin, or using real identities to register to Bitcoin system. It is impossible to completely ban all the use of Bitcoin because there is no specific center to issue Bitcoin. And the real-name authentication may leak users' privacy when Bitcoin exchanges are attacked. Therefore we introduce the regulation nodes into Bitcoin system to reveal criminals' identities.
In this paper, we first proposed a Bitcoin regulation system with access control policies. In the system, the regulation node can reveal the identities of suspicious users by decrypting the ciphertexts that contain identities. Since the ciphertexts are encrypted by users themselves, some users may encrypt a fake identity. To verify the reality of identities, we adopt a modified signature based on the identity-based signature to generate wallet key pairs. The wallet addresses are related to users' identities and only when one's identity is public can we get all the wallet addresses of the user. Regulation nodes are divided into different levels with different privileges. If a regulation node wants to view an identity of a suspicious transaction, it decrypts the ciphertext using attribute key, and verifies the reality of the identity according to the wallet address which is used in this transaction. If it is a fake identity, the regulation node can get the real identity from the key server, and freezes all the wallet addresses of this user. In this way, both protection of privacy and regulation of transactions can be achieved simultaneously. The regulation node must be carefully determined because they have the more privileges than the general users.
Note that in our scheme, the transaction just takes place directly between the users, and Bitcoins are not issued by a third party. The authorized regulation nodes reveal users' identities of a transaction only when a transaction is doubted to involve illegal acts. So the regulation nodes are not the center of the system. In other words, the new system is still decentralized.
